The 250 SQ MILES intrusion by the Pakistani Army into the Indian, held areas south if the Line of Actual Control (LAC), but now being called simply as L of C in the Kargil Sub-Sector of the Ladakh Division, has its historic background and strategic fallout.

The defensive posture in Kargil, Drass, and even Gurais in the North West have not materially changed since July 1972. Indian Army generally dominated the Pakistani defences across the L of C. But the rugged nature of the terrain, and the accessibility of good roads on the Pakistani side vis-à-vis Indian, necessitated better vigilance and quicker tactical responses from us. Instead, the Formation headquarters followed the old procedure of vacating piquets and posts non-maintainable during the winter months.

While the troops were committed actively to liquidating the Pak-Proxy War in J&K, the Pakistani Army, taking advantage of their pre-occupations, began to inch forward into the No-Man’s Land, south of the L of C in their Baltistan Sector. In 1998, they took advantage of ‘vacation of high altitude posts during the winter’ by the troops located between Zoji La and Kargil-Tortuk (Turtuk) and occupied these posts before the return of the Indian troops in May 1999. The aims of these Pakistani intrusions most probably were to :

These were then to assist Pakistan in furthering its Proxy War in the Valley and even internationalize the so-called cause of Kashmir.

The force the Pakistani intruded was large: about six to eight Battalions of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), their Special Services Group (SSG), a mix of other regular units and some 1,500 Islamic guerrillas primarily from POK and Afghanistan, with a sprinkling of other Islamic mercenaries and fundamentalists. Their controlling headquarters and logistical bases were all located in Baltistan and in Pakistani forward defended areas and localities on their side of L of C, although helicopter support ensured that the troops inducted into the Indian territory were logistically taken care of.

The Sikh Regiment had two of its Battalions, the 8th Sikh and the 14 Sikh totally involved in Operation Vijay and both acquitted themselves with elan and admirable operational worthiness.

8 Sikh forming part of 192 Mountain Brigade was tasked to capture the ‘Tiger Hill’. By May 21st, 8 Sikh isolated ‘Tiger hill’ from three directions: east, north and south. Isolation from West was, however, extremely difficult as the complete ridge line was occupied by the enemy. Added to it, the climatic conditions were woefully harsh and terrain absolutely rugged. But the companies gradually inched their way up closer to the enemy. Each night the snow would be burrowed through, creating a crawl trench and a new post would be established, each time, a little higher. All along, the weather continued to be extremely harsh, with sleet and snow raining down with enemy shelling. The brave Sikhs endured it all daring the enemy to show himself up and get ready for the final prayers to be read by the Shers (or the Lions) of 8th Sikh!

During this phase a number of probing actions were undertaken to inflict casualties on the enemy. These included small raids, ‘fire attacks’ with mixed teams of MMGs and Rocket launchers combined with Mortar and Artillery concentrations. The aim was to un-nerve the enemy and force abandonment of their defences. Although the enemy was hemmed in from three sides effectively and had suffered major casualties, it became necessary to reinforce 8th Sikh’s effort at reducing the ‘Tiger hill’. A fresh Battalion (18th grenadiers or ‘Grinders’, as they call themselves) was then moved up to capture the ‘Tiger Hill’, while Sikhs provided it with the firm base, besides acting as reserve and containing the enemy by launching feints from south and north during the main attack from the east.

The attack went in on night of July 3rd and morning of July 4th and the ‘Grinders’ captured the ‘Eastern Slope’, but further advance and consolidation were effectively interfered with from ‘Helmet Top’, ‘India Gate’ and features to the west.

By the morning of July 4th, 8 Sikh was warned to explore the possibility of cutting off the ‘Western Spur’ which involved capture of ‘Western Slope’, ‘Helmet’, ‘India gate’ et al. The challenge was accepted by the Unit in these extremely trying conditions. Company comprising the best troops of the Unit including the Commandos had already been kept ready to seize any operational opportunity. It had been, in fact, envisaged so in the planning stage itself. Major Ravindra Singh was detailed as the Company Commander, and it included Lieutenant RK Sehrawat, four ICOs and 52 OR all pick of the Unit.

By the afternoon of July 4th, the Unit was ordered to "gain a foothold on the Western Spur" of ‘Tiger Hill’, with a view to cut it off from the west and facilitate the final capture of the remaining portion of ‘Tiger Hill’.

Accordingly, on the night of 4th July and morning of July 5th, the company traversed the difficult terrain amidst enemy shelling and automatic fire to the base of the objective. WaheGuru helped the Sikhs with an ideal weather for attack. It rained heavily and the hills were covered with fog. The company negotiated the steep slopes undetected with mountaineering skill and established a ‘fire base’ behind a rock approximately 200 yards from the objective. Then three assault teams under Subedar Nirmal Singh, Naib Subedar Karnail Singh and Naib Subedar Ravil Singh probed towards the objective. And off they charged at 1.00 a.m. on July 5th; their Bole So Nihal, Sat Sri Akal, ranting the cold dark night of the imposing ‘Tiger Hill’.

The enemy was totally surprised with the sudden assault of these teams on ‘India Gate’ and ‘Helmet’ area. With the capture of ‘India Gate’ and ‘Helmet’ the formidable and prestigious enemy’s main defence in the Drass Sector, the enemy did everything to recapture ‘India Gate’ and ‘Helmet’ but failed to dislodge the Khalsas and instead lost two officers and 30 men in the counter attack. "SARAGARHI", the Sikh Regiment’s unparalleled Battle Honour, had found a comparison in the defenders of ‘Helmet’ and ‘India Gate’ below the ‘Tiger Hill Top’.

It was undoubtedly their resolute defiance against all odds, exceptional devotion to duty which enthused them to hold on to the objective at great cost. These gallant actions and the great sacrifices of the Khalsa paved the way for subsequent capture of ‘Tiger Hill Top’ with negligible resistance from the enemy on July 7th when the ‘Grinders’ attacked and captured the small part left on their side.

The Battalion suffered 114 casualties including 35 killed. Among them were, Lieutenant Kanad Bhattacharya, Subedar Joginder Singh, Subedar Nirmal Singh, Naib Subedar Ravail Singh, and Naib Subedar Karnail Singh. Major JS Rathore, Major Ravindra Singh, Lt. Pallab Choudhary, and RK Sehrawat, Subedars Kuldip Singh and Sardar a Singh, were among the 79 wounded.

Unfortunately Colonel SP Singh, the Commanding Officer was killed in the operational area in early September 1999.

While 8 Sikh made great history on the ‘Tiger Hill’, 14 Sikh that was air-transported to Leh from Delhi, had its own part to play in Chorbat La area. In doing so it not only secured Handangbrok heights but captured Points 5620, 5512, 5232, beside Point 5310 and Point 6041, across the L of C in the Pak Occupied Areas. The Regiment came out with flying colours from Operation Vijay as they have done in all other operations of Wars that the Indian Army has fought. It lived upto its great historical honour of being ‘Bravest Among the Braves’ - Brave de la braves, as Napoleon Bonaparte called his finest troops.